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1. Importance of the Research  
The research of Counterinsurgency Warfare is underappreciated in 
the context of military interventions in today’s conflicts. The research 
question of the current thesis is why the Untied States of America and its 
allies couldn’t defeat the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The conflict 
in Iraq was very spectacular in the sense, that the quick conventional victory 
over the armed forces of Iraq was followed by an insurgency only months 
after the victory, which the Armed Forces of the United States couldn’t 
control – President George W. Bush announced the end of major combat 
operations on the 1st of May 2003 and the first spectacular attacks took 
place in August of the same year. Meanwhile the Taliban movement, which 
was thought had been defeated in early 2002 was making a comeback a few 
years later partly thanks to the safe havens on the border Pakistani side of 
the border, and the US and coalition forces struggled to contain resurgent 
Taliban.  
The situation is paradoxical, because the Untied States has the 
biggest defence budget in the world, and has unique capabilities in this 
field. The enemies faced by the United States in both theatres has only 
minimal technological and fiscal means. There were many explanations 
over the years about why the US failed: the use and nature of force has 
changed, the nature of coalition warfare, the restructuration of the 
international system, the change in linking with use of force, the 
compensatory nature of globalization etc. were all popular explanations. 
The other popular explanation was, that the nature of insurgency has 
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changed, thanks to which insurgencies were able to use the above 
mentioned trends partially and became hard to handle threats.  
The author while researching the question came to the conclusion, 
that it is insufficient to research the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts by 
themselves – there are fundamental theoretical questions about the use of 
force which need to be addressed. And this requires the thorough research 
of the development of counterinsurgency warfare theory.  
The objective of the thesis is to present the development of 
counterinsurgency warfare, show the weaknesses and problems of the 
theory and the current threats, to which the theory didn’t have an answer 
due to its intermittent development. The counterinsurgency theory and 
practice of non-democratic states doesn’t constitute the focus of this thesis. 
This is due to the important political-military differences between 
democracies and non-democratic states, which make comparison difficult.  
The thesis researches the British, French and also American routes of 
population centric counterinsurgency warfare and lays a big emphasis on 
the American development. The cause of this is, that the US has a dominant 
position in today’s counterinsurgency theory in the Western world – thanks 
to NATO and bilateral agreements. The countries participating in the Iraqi 
and Afghan interventions were also under American command most of 
times. Because of this it is safe to assume, that the US and NATO doctrine 
had a great influence on our country’s tactics and procedures. This justifies 
the research of how the theory developed, and that was a great focus of the 
author.  
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2. Methods used in the course of the research  
While conducting the research the author used primary sources – the 
works of theoreticians and military doctrines, which had great influence to 
the current doctrines – and secondary sources – sources, which described 
counterinsurgencies from a military or other point of view. The two most 
important sources were British and French counterinsurgency literature, 
because these constituted the sources for today’s counterinsurgency theory.  
We divide the development of counterinsurgency theory into three 
phases:  
 preclassical period: 1896-1944  
 classical period: 1944-1982  
 neoclassical period: 1982-today  
During the century, which these three periods roughly cover, there 
were significant advances in counterinsurgency theory and practice, which 
we will analyse and then review the major theoretical schools.  
The hypothesis of the thesis is the following:  
 The problems of execution in today’s counterinsurgencies 
are caused by the division of the political and military 
spheres on the strategic level.  
The thesis will present in detail the major theoretical works which 
are unavailable in Hungarian. Because the topic isn’t greatly researched in 
Hungary, there is no Hungarian language literature to speak of. In the 
course of conducting the research one of the major challenges was to 
acquire the relevant literature. Thanks to this effort the author has acquired 
a collection of a few hundred books on the topic of irregular military 
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conflicts in English and in German. The thesis accomplishes a non-declared 
objective of calling the attention to these works and in the available space 
tries to promote them.  
The thesis lay great emphasis on post World War 2 period, the pre 
1944 period is mentioned only as much as needed to apprehend the major 
developments in counterinsurgency theory. In the post World War 2 period 
there were two major periods, in which counterinsurgency became central: 
the period of decolonization, and the post 9/11 period. During the period of 
decolonization the conflicts which were carried out with the participation of 
non-state actors were less visible and intensive, but politically important in 
reshaping the international system. In the post Cold War era the increasing 
number of frail states gave a great boost to the spread of irregular groups. In 
the literature the previous topic has greater emphasis – this is underlined by 
its importance, because big parts of the world were involved – so thesis has 
to have great emphasis on this.  
The question of international military interventions is continually 
present because of fragile and failed stats, and the problems surrounding 
them. The question of the use of force is intimately interlocked with this in 
the international system. The rules of the use of force have greatly changed 
after World War 2, and after the Cold War new uses have been found, such 
as peace keeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian intervention etc.  
For the irregular militant groups World War 2 was a breakthrough on 
many grounds. In the Western world such groups weren’t recognized as 
legitimate combatants and international law reflected this view. During 
World War 2 externally supported resistance and guerrilla groups got a 
great role in the fight against the German and Japanese forces. Due to this 
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fact after World War 2 the irregular militant ‘earned’ the combatant status 
with the adoption of the Geneva Conventions in 1949.  
The relevant counterinsurgency practice of World War 2 
accumulated on the Japanese and German sides – the Allied forces (with the 
exception of the Soviets, who fought insurgents in the Ukraine) weren’t 
forced to engage in large scale counterinsurgency operations. The early 
American counterinsurgency doctrine was nevertheless influenced by Axis 
practice, but with the beginning of the Cold War they quickly became less 
relevant. This was in great part due to the aforementioned fact, that 
international law changed in favour of irregular forces. The relevant 
practice of colonial powers became more relevant.  
It is questionable, if the armies of the United States and Western 
European countries focused enough attention to the problem of this kind of 
conflict and the adaptation process it takes to succeed in them. While great 
changes were occurring in the emphasis compared to conventional interstate 
war. However counterinsurgency operations are by nature unloved military 
operations in the European and American political and military mind set. 
Important definitions. The author places great emphasis on 
delimitating important concepts, because many publications are using 
concepts in wrong or misleading ways. Such concepts, as resistance, 
terrorism and insurgency are put under a thorough review. The author 
defines operational concepts, such as anti-terrorism, counterterrorism, 
nonconventional warfare, foreign internal defence and stabilization 
operations.  
 Irregular activity: ‘The use or threat of force by irregular 
forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or 
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criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a 
challenge to governance and authority.’ (AAP-6 [2013] p. 
2-I-9.) 
 Counterinsurgency: ‘Comprehensive civilian and military 
efforts made to defeat an insurgency and to address any 
core grievances.’ (AAP-6 [2013] p. 2-C-16.) 
 Population centric counterinsurgency: population security is 
central. Attacking insurgent groups is secondary, because to 
succeed, the counterinsurgent needs the cooperation of the 
population. This school of thought lays great emphasis on 
development and rebuilding, securing the political 
legitimacy, providing security for the population etc. In 
colonial times the resettlement of the population could be 
counted as a population centric approach. In today’s world 
the policing and strategic communications approaches as 
well as cultural sensitivity could be counted as population 
centric counterinsurgency approaches.  
 Enemy centric counterinsurgency: the main emphasis is on 
attacking insurgent groups. Actions taken at killing and 
capturing the leadership of insurgent organizations, 
strengthening boarders to counter infiltration, organizing 
amnesty etc. can be counted as parts of this approach. In 
colonial times collective responsibility and punishment 
were part of this approach. Nowadays counter-network 
operations can be counted to the enemy centric approach.  
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 Jihadi movement: ‘It comprises organizations, groups, 
assemblies, scholars, intellectuals, symbolic figures, and the 
individuals who have adopted the ideology of armed jihad 
against the existing regimes in the Arab‐Islamic world on 
the basis that these are apostate regimes ruling by not what 
Allah said (…), by legislating without Allah, and by giving 
their loyalty and assistance to the various infidel enemies of 
the Islamic Nation. The jihadi current has also adopted the 
program of armed jihad against the colonialist forces which 
attack Muslim lands on the basis that those regimes are 
allies fighting Islam and Muslims.’ (quoted by Lia [2010] p. 
103.)  
 
3. Results of the Research  
3.1 Development of British Counterinsurgency Theory  
The British Army accumulated one of the greatest experience in 
conducting counterinsurgencies in the 20th century. The first notable work 
on this subject emerged in 1896 by then Col. Charles E. Callwell. bearing 
the title Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. This work emerged in 
the context of what was then known as imperial policing, and Callwell’s 
work became a classic. He cites many conflicts and suggests appropriate 
tactical approaches for success. (Jones [2007] p. 5.) A great strength of 
Callwell’s work is how it addresses many problems which are also 
problems today, such as gathering accurate intelligence, developing strategy 
and using it on the operational and tactical levels, what kind of logistical 
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and security problems exist etc. He gives advice on how to secure the 
population to isolate the insurgent. He concluded, that irregular conflicts 
cannot be won by applying schemes previously decided and cannot be won 
by applying conventional warfare. (Alderson [2010] p. 32.)  
The British counterinsurgency doctrine developed four great 
principles, three of which only came into existence only after World War 2: 
1. the use of minimum force (1923)  
2. considering insurgency as a political act (1949)  
3. the need to cut the connections between the insurgent 
and the population (1963)  
4. recognizing the political-social-economic dimension of 
the problem (1969) (Alderson [2010] 127. o.)] 
The development of British doctrine showed a progressive 
adaptation to the international realities after World War 2. Thanks to great 
practical experience emanating from the conflicts in Malaya, Kenya and 
Cyprus the population centric approach became the main focus of doctrine. 
The doctrines attributed great importance in achieving success to factors 
such as destroying insurgent infrastructure, subversive forces etc. (Alderson 
[2009] 111-112. o.)  
The most notable official doctrine during the Cold War was the 1969 
Counter‐Revolutionary Operations. This was the most complete doctrine to 
that date. It used a comprehensive definition of insurgency and tried hard to 
integrate the notion to other concepts in use at the time. It set up five main 
priorities, which were to be achieved in order to be successful:  
1. developing a national plan (political and economic reforms, 
coordination among security services etc.)  
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2. good governance  
3. popular support  
4. creating an unbiased law enforcement  
5. creating an effective security structure  
The development of British theory also gave to important authors to 
the discussion about counterinsurgency: Robert Thompson and Frank 
Kitson. Thompson developed in his 1966 work, Defeating Communist 
insurgency his own formula for defeating an insurgent movement, which 
was an important starting point for Counter‐Revolutionary Operations 
(1969). Kitson developed important ideas about how the Army can and 
should support civil authority in case of insurgencies.  
 
3.2 Development of French Theory 
The French experience rested in great part on the colonization of 
Algeria and Indochina. Though in the end both were lost causes from the 
French point of view, they contributed greatly to the development of the 
Revolutionary Warfare Doctrine (Doctrine de la guerre révolutionnaire, 
DGR). 
Charles Lacheroy is considered the first major contributor. He 
developed important ideas about what was then called revolutionary war. 
His main aim was to explain how seemingly stronger power were defeated 
by seemingly weak actors in the course of revolutionary wars. In his view 
revolutionary wars were the real total wars, and the real aim is not the 
battlefield but the rear are of the enemy and getting control over the 
population. Although there were later many disagreements between those 
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who contributed to the DGR and it wasn’t a lasting force in France itself, it 
is one of the main sources of inspiration for the theory of today. The DGR 
had two outstanding authors, whose work is relevant today: Roger Trinquier 
and David Galula.  
Trinquier’s Modern Warfare had many insight on population control, 
tactics against enemy civil-military organizations etc. He described in detail 
how it is suitable to pacify areas controlled by the enemy.  
Galula was not the typical representative of DGR, however during 
his time as an officer in Algeria, he came to know intimately the DGR. 
After the war he has written his main work Counterinsurgency Warfare: 
Theory and Practice, which was published in English. This way Galula’s 
effect on the English speaking world was reinforced. Galula developed for 
‘laws’ and six ‘steps’ for defeating an insurgency. These were aimed at 
securing the support of the population and more than any other author who 
emphasized the primary role of politics in securing the population (among 
others, he suggested in the liberated areas the emerging pro 
counterinsurgent leaders should be organized into a party for the national 
political stage). Galula’s legacy is still relevant today.  
 
3.3 The Development of Counterinsurgency Theory in the United 
States  
The preclassical era of counterinsurgency was markedly different 
affair compared to the British and French experience, because of the 
absence of colonialism. However as part of defending the interest of the 
United States, many non-colonial interventions were conducted by the US 
before World War 2. This required a different kind of use of force. The 
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interventions in this era were typified by the limited manner in which they 
were conducted, their main aim being the restoration or empowering of a 
pro-US political leadership. For this purpose they intended to create a 
government which had legitimacy.  
Although the British experience had some influence on the American 
thinking, there was a distinct American way of handling these conflicts. The 
Americans recognized that conventional warfare is of little use in these 
situations. At the same time they were convinced of the usefulness of the 
organization and equipment of modern armies and methods which proved 
successful. However the American preclassical concept lacked some of the 
political dimension compared to the British. The expeditionary nature of 
American counterinsurgencies in this era generated some useful experience, 
but these were largely forgotten after World War 2.  
After World War 2 revolutionary warfare became the main threat 
and doctrine writers tried to use German experiences in new doctrines. 
These were of temporary nature, and the growing American experiences in 
the Cold War gave new focus. The election of President Jon F. Kennedy 
brought new urgency to the development of counterinsurgency doctrine, 
because Kennedy was convinced, that the Soviet Union and its allies are 
conducting an offensive in the form of revolutionary wars against the 
Western world. During his lifetime a many new doctrines were written and 
after his death, with the increasing commitment of American ground forces 
to the Vietnamese theatre, the conduct of counterinsurgency operations 
became a day to day task. There are conflicting views regarding the 
effectiveness of these, however, because the war was seen as lost, it became 
quickly not fashionable to talk about counterinsurgency.  
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The Vietnam war had a dampening effect on the further development 
of counterinsurgency doctrine. President Richard M. Nixon sought to 
reduce commitments of this kind and in the Nixon doctrine he declared, that 
the US would provide help for other countries, but would not send actual 
military forces to help fight in these conflicts. This approach proved popular 
among later administrations. Counterinsurgency doctrine became irrelevant 
for a long time.  
In the post Cold War era the need for reintroducing 
counterinsurgency soon emerged. But politically it was inconceivable to 
conduct such operations. A notable attempt, which tried to incorporate 
counterinsurgency in the US perspective was the Fourth Generation 
Warfare ‘school’, which was not really significant before 9/11. During the 
nineties the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was the accepted notion 
on how the future capabilities should be built. RMA envisaged a technology 
centred war, in which the side, which can achieve information domination 
(meaning real time access to the situation from the tactical to the strategic 
levels, based on a really expensive and complicated sensor network). The 
1991 Gulf War seemed to vindicate this point of view, but after the 2003 
invasion of Iraq it proved it had its limitations.  
 
3.4 The modern problems of insurgencies  
The conflicts currently in progress against what is usually called a 
jihadi movement (consisting of many groups, representing diverging 
ideologies) is one of the main factors. Although the perception is, that these 
groups function effectively in military matters, this is not true: there are 
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many factors that are working against the military and political 
effectiveness of these groups. The thesis lays great emphasis on the 
theoretical development of insurgency in the last decades as developed by 
members of the jihadi movement. There are some important lessons on how 
the jihadi thinkers are using the classical insurgent literature and how they 
deviate from it. There is also major structural differences between the 
classical insurgencies that effect their development. For the sake of 
shortness, we will concentrate in this summary on the structural problems in 
the following.  
The jihadi groups usually depend on charismatic leadership, 
ideology and other factors play a more minor role compared to this. The 
formal decision making bodies are less relevant because of this and some 
groups don’t create institutional bodies at all, which would be able to 
balance the power of the charismatic leader. Because ideologically the 
jihadi movement can only count on a minority of the population in their 
(usually fundamentalist) reformist agenda, and there’s usually no real 
prospect to widen this audience in the absence of radical change to the core 
values.  
Jihadi groups have an elitist altitude usually, and want to bring their 
agenda from the top down to the society they want to transform. They don’t 
usually have a big supporting network or underground, which could engage 
in subversion in the classical sense. Jihadi mentality usually prevents this, 
because non-violent approaches are believed to be unworkable and jihadis 
usually refuse to participate in legal political processes, believing they are 
corrupt. Through active communication however, once violent means are 
introduced, such movements are capable of gathering some following.  
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The most visible difference compared to the classical era of 
insurgency is the multitude of actors on the insurgent side. The classical 
centralized party or political movement is no more. The only thing uniting 
insurgents groups usually involves some negative approach, meaning that 
the foundation of cooperation is not a common goal but a common enemy 
(such as foreign military presence).  
The economic model of insurgency has also changed greatly: earlier 
the population proved to be the main source of food, medical supplies, 
clothing etc. for the insurgents, and it was of primary importance for the 
counterinsurgent to disrupt the flow of goods by isolating the insurgent 
from the population in order to defeat the insurgency. Today the insurgents 
don’t need control of the population to secure their supplies, and jihadi 
groups usually cannot (and need not) exert effective population control on 
territories under their control, which is partially due to their organizational 
weakness.  
The smaller organization, which is a hallmark of current insurgent 
groups, needs less supplies and it needs other kinds of supplies compared to 
the classical era. New ways of financial models have emerged since the 
classical era, such as drug production and trafficking, participating in 
organized crime, collecting civilian donations, winning over rich individuals 
for support etc. The role of cities as the main venues of insurgent violence 
also brought a new quality to the conflict and stands in strong contrast to the 
rural based insurgencies of the classical era.  
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3.5 Third Party Counterinsurgency  
Counterinsurgencies conducted along the lines of the third party 
counterinsurgency model are seen by the author as the alternative to the 
colonial political system, which can provide a stable political background 
for these operations. In the course of classical insurgencies usually two 
sides were present: the insurgent and the counterinsurgent (the latter 
meaning often the colonial power). In the current setting this model is no 
longer useful. In Iraq as well as in Afghanistan a third party approach was 
dominating since 2004 and 2003 respectively: the operations were 
conducted in concert with the newly formed security forces of these 
countries. These third party counterinsurgencies deviate in many respects 
form those in the preclassical and classical era. On the one hand in both 
countries the international forces had to support an extremely weak 
government, which was newly established. In both cases the use of military 
force was at first not intended to include counterinsurgency warfare. This is 
a major difference compared to the classical where the defence of the 
colonial system was the main task.  
We define third party counterinsurgency the following way: ‘the 
third party counterinsurgent is a political and military actor, which arrives to 
the conflict zone from a third country, uses large conventional military force 
to support the legitimate and internationally recognized government of the 
country, with which it operates in concert to defeat the insurgency’. (For 
comparison Erin Simpson defines large as more than 1000 soldiers from 
general purpose forces (Simpson [2010]). Sending advisers or special forces 
is not considered to be third party counterinsurgency, because this kind of 
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support is in the category of Foreign Internal Defence, constituting a 
qualitatively different kind of help. Also the third party counterinsurgent 
has different strategic options compared to the two actor modell:  
 tries to halt the advance of the insurgency militarily while 
helping to build up (or when necessary create) capable state 
institutions to handle the threat by themselves  
 tries to create a political settlement between the government 
and the reconcilable insurgent forces  
 leaves militarily and lets the conflict develop its own way 
(although this doesn’t necessarily mean an end to political 
or economic support).  
Victory in the classical sense in a third party counterinsurgency – 
meaning military success, which has the effect that the insurgents are 
pushed back and the legitimacy of the government is restored – is the task 
of the host nation government. The third party can only help by giving aid 
in restoring the monopoly of violence and playing a constructive political 
role (helping negotiating or other specific help) ensuring that the host nation 
prevails over the insurgent.  
The key to a successful third party approach is ensuring the 
legitimacy on three fronts: on the domestic political side of the third party 
counterinsurgent, in the domestic political side of the host nation and in the 
wider international community. The role of the latter is important, because 
the effective conduct of operations is depending on the support of many 
international organizations and building multinational partnerships and 
coalitions. The legitimacy of the operation has to be achieved also in order 
to grant the support of non governmental actors, which also provide 
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necessary capabilities for the counterinsurgency effort. This has to be 
achieved in a media environment, which is much more balanced compared 
to the classical era: the internet and developing technology provide useful 
tools for insurgents to conduct effective strategic communications 
campaigns. (Mackinlay [2005] pp. 59-61.)  
It is also important to note, that the host nation is not only a partner 
in this efforts, but also a hindering factor sometimes. For example: 
 the political leadership of the host nation can restrict the 
cooperation in critical areas, it can deviate in its strategic 
communication contradicting the third party 
counterinsurgent etc. which decreases the effectiveness of 
the cooperation  
 the host nation can have structural problems, which make 
successful cooperation more difficult, but are difficult to 
overcome because of political barriers (such as corruption)  
 it is possible, that the host nation cannot effectively function 
but because of prestige or other concerns refuses to accept 
help, which by decreasing the effectiveness of the host 
nation government decreases the effectiveness of the 
cooperation.  
The third party counterinsurgent also has to invest a lot of effort into 
not becoming the main focus of the insurgency, thereby providing a 
unifying target around which various insurgent groups can rally. On the 
other side, the presence of a strong military actor or coalition can lead to the 
unwanted consequence, that in the absence of a political solution the host 
nation government can become dependent on outside help for stabilizing 
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their position, which has to be avoided (also in economic, security or other 
fields), because this hinders the development of the host nation capacities.  
Simpson cites numerous fields, where third party counterinsurgent 
have significant handicaps compared to the two actor model, which 
decreases their chances of success, despite the fact, that third party 
counterinsurgent are militarily usually strong actor. Simpson cites the 
following reasons:  
 Information deficit: the third party doesn’t poses accurate 
information about the battlefield to form a realistic picture 
about the situation  
 Military deficit: although the third party counterinsurgent is 
a dominant military power, it is only able to generate 
military effectiveness in a conventional sense, it is usually 
unsuited for counterinsurgency warfare  
 Political deficit: the outcome of the intervention usually 
doesn’t threaten the security or existence of the third party 
counterinsurgent, but the handling of the war becomes 
increasingly difficult with the passing of time  
 Strategic deficit: the success hangs in large part on the 
achievements and capability of the host nation government. 
If it fails expectations, it loses its legitimacy and the 
situation of the third party counterinsurgent becomes 
untenable. It would be almost impossible to disengage and 
present the result as a win for the dominant military power. 
(Simpson [2010] pp. 35-37.)  
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There is a strong relationship between the political and the strategic 
deficit, because the third party isn’t physically threatened and so it has a 
difficult case to move against the insurgents with full force. To add to that, 
the third party usually has different military commitments which it has to 
honour, and also, the seemingly excessive use of force can bring about 
domestic political problems. The moral judgement of the domestic public 
opinion of the third party is also an important measure (for example it was 
accepted in World War 2, that strategic bombing was used in large part 
against the enemy civilian population, which was labelled as unethical in 
Vietnam).  
One can add to the difficulties the problem of the ‘unforeseen’. The 
most visible of which is that the appearance of the third party in a 
counterinsurgency can provide a unifying effect on the competing insurgent 
forces (in strong contrast to the domestic public opinion of the third party, 
where such actions can be divisive). Mack called this phenomenon indirect 
cohesion. (Mack [1975] pp. 182-183.)  
Beneath the military deficit lies a complex phenomenon. There is an 
easily comprehensible part regarding the language and cultural dimensions. 
But this is intertwined with a structural capability loss, which occurred in 
Western militaries after World War 2. Many units, which were established 
to handle civil infrastructure for the war effort in occupied territories were 
disbanded, which were capabilities of great importance for 
counterinsurgencies. (Kitson [1991] p. 187.) This trend is alive today.  
In the case of the third party the political and military deficits are 
also intertwined in the domestic discourse about the use of force. 
Counterinsurgencies and conventional wars have different needs, and in 
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most cases there is a bias on part of the officer corps in favour of 
conventional war. (Kitson [1991] pp. 199-201.) Galula argues, that there are 
other factors complicating the relationship in the minds of soldiers between 
conventional wars an counterinsurgencies. He argues, that 
counterinsurgencies are much harder to train for, and also the politisation of 
the armed forces goes against entrenched values, but is needed for a 
successful counterinsurgency operation. Adding to the military deficit is the 
fact, that weapons developed for conventional war, are mostly unsuited for 
counterinsurgency operations. (Thompson [1966] p. 62.)  
Today there is a clear trend of building coalitions to overcome some 
of these problems, which have a significant civilian contribution. There are 
many difficulties in creating a viable coordinating mechanism between 
these various actors. The thesis analyses AJP-3.4.4 along the lines of the 
third party counterinsurgency theory  
 
3.6 Conclusions  
On the tactical and operational levels the development of population 
centric counterinsurgency wasn’t straight forward. Considering the British 
examples, almost in every conflict the Army had to face serious tactical 
difficulties, which it handled sometimes in a wrong way (making the 
conflict longer). The British theory development with the political interests 
and legal framework of the colonial background in mind, taking into 
account the colonial bureaucracy, which provided important administrative 
tools for the counterinsurgency. In the French case the colonial framework 
had a very different meaning, the Army had a much greater say in what to 
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do compared to the British. After World War 2 the French had a radically 
different view of the threat they were facing in the form of revolutionary 
war. The legal framework had a much smaller role in the approach of the 
developing DRG school, and the extra-legal approach was powerful. The 
French example however was useful in giving an example on how to 
combine the military and administrative matters. The American experience 
in the preclassical era could have provided important lessons for future 
expeditionary counterinsurgencies, but because of political limitations and 
institutional distinctiveness they were put aside. The need for political 
support was however well underlined by these operation. The American 
experience is also important, because it is a great example on how a 
democratic system with enough care on the tactical level can incorporate 
(enemy centric) tactics from a non-democratic country.  
In sum we can say, that population centric counterinsurgency theory 
provides the only available alternative with which (under the current 
political framework) it is possible to counter insurgencies effectively to a 
certain degree.  
The historical examples make it clear, that in the course of a conflict 
it is of utmost importance to provide a stable political background at home. 
The disintegration of the colonial framework (or in the case of the US the 
great power ambitions) and the strengthening of the legal status of the 
irregular groups in armed conflict resulted in the viability of insurgency as a 
strategic concept. Thanks to the same factors the context of 
counterinsurgency changed greatly: it became expeditionary and supporting 
and outside government in its nature. With the change of political objectives 
the situation became more complicated: compared to the classical era, when 
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the support of the status quo was the main objective, in the neoclassical 
period counterinsurgencies were conducted in a situation, where changing 
the status quo was the main objective. Adding to the problems was the fact, 
that with the dissolution of the colonial framework there was a halt in the 
comprehensive development of counterinsurgency theory (which doesn’t 
mean of course, that tactical innovation and adaptation wasn’t conducted). 
Only in the last few years with the emergence of the third party 
counterinsurgency theory was there a theory which promised to be a 
framework, which is able to take into account the changed political realities 
and provide a comprehensive approach ranging from the tactical to the 
strategic level.  
FM 3-24 was in small part and AJP-3.4.4 greater part able adapt to 
these realities by integrating elements of the third party approach. But the 
limitations of these doctrines is significant, because they are only intended 
for the operational military approach and aren’t intended to provide 
guidance for the strategic level, they can only absorb strategic realities.  
In light of this we can say, that the hypothesis is validated. Although 
the separation of political and military factors is due to historical reasons, 
and due to the fact that the tasks of the military became manifold, the 
change in civil-military cooperation needed for the successful conduct of 
counterinsurgency operations is at best only partially possible (and in a 
conventional conflict it could be disadvantageous), but the possibility needs 
to remain.  
Counterinsurgency can be an important tool to counter emerging 
transnational threats emanating from weak states in the future, so the 
institutional learning process and the preservation of institutional 
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knowledge is very important to cut the learning process in future conflict 
environments and the enhancing of the political-military effectiveness in 
solving the conflict.  
The further avenues of research regarding the third party 
counterinsurgency model are numerous. On the one hand there is a 
possibility to conduct research on how different political systems are able to 
adopt this framework in practice. On the other hand there is a great 
opportunity to research the background on the coalition nature of current 
counterinsurgency warfare, because the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have provided numerous cases which are worth studying.  
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